Dissecting China’s Response to the Wagner Rebellion

Omar Adan

Global Courant

Like mercenaries attacked Moscow on June 24, 2023, it probably wasn’t just Russian President Vladimir Putin and his ruling elite in Russia watching with concern. There may also have been worried faces in China.

During the war in Ukraine, Beijing did did a balancing act of sorts – standing next to Putin as an ally and one economic lifeline to Russia while trying to isolate China from the prospect of some instability in a neighboring country. A coup in Russia would turn this careful diplomatic dance on its head and give Beijing new headaches.

Joseph Torigian, a expert on China and Russia at American Universitydiscusses here how Beijing has responded to the chaotic 24 hours in which mercenary chief Yevgeny Prigozhin challenged the Kremlin – and why it matters.

Do we have any clues as to how Beijing perceived the events?

It will be hard to guess what Beijing is really thinking, especially since it has been there little official comment. Russians understand that the Chinese media is – just like their own tightly controlled.

Historically, Russians have cared deeply about how they are portrayed in the Chinese press. As such, China will be careful about what is printed so that Chinese officials do not get a hearing from Russian diplomats.

However, real signs of concern may be emerging from Beijing. In a tweet that was later deleted, political commentator Hu Xijin wrote: “(Progozhin’s) armed insurrection has brought the Russian political situation to a turning point. Regardless of its outcome, Russia cannot return to the country before the uprising.”

Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the Wagner group, speaks in Bakhmut in a video released earlier this year. Photo: Telegram channel / @concordgroup_official

Similarly, China Daily – a publication of the Central Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party – quoted two concerned Chinese scholars as in his reporting in the Wagner Group episode.

Such comments could be a subtle way for Beijing to suggest to Moscow that it needs to put its house in order. These views could also serve to remind the outside world that China and Russia are different political systems and that Beijing will not always act in line with Moscow.

At the same time, the Chinese government will make every effort not to support a narrative that Beijing is concerned about the strategic partnership. Global Times, a Chinese state newspaper, has already done so rejected coverage in the Western media that China’s “bet” on Putin was a mistake. Such claims will be portrayed in China as a plot to damage Sino-Russian relations.

So will the Wagner episode affect China’s support for Putin?

The Chinese government probably believes that Putin is still the best chance for stability in Russia and that support for him is one of the core foundations the bilateral relationship.

Some Chinese commentators have noted that Putin emerged victorious quickly, and with little bloodshed. They may be right – although the rebellion is widely seen as a disgracemany observers in the West also believe that Putin will survive the crisis.

On the Russian side, given the importance of China to them during the war in Ukraine, officials in Moscow will expect the People’s Republic of China to show clear support for Putin.

During earlier moments of intimacy in the relationship, such help was expected and appreciated. In 1957, then Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev narrowly defeated a couphe was so thankful that the Chinese blessed his victory promised to give them a nuclear weapon.

The question is how Beijing would have reacted if the mutiny had escalated. History suggests that the Chinese may be tempted to intervene, but also that they understand the challenges such action would face.

For example during the 1991 attempted coup by Soviet hardliners against then-President Mikhail Gorbachev, some of Beijing’s leaders considered providing economic support. Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, a longtime Soviet skeptic, put an end to those nascent plans and the coup failed.

What lessons would the Chinese have learned for their own system?

It is difficult to overstate how what happens in Russia has historically shaped thinking in China about their own country.

The birth of the Chinese Communist Party, the Cultural Revolutionthe economic reforms of thereform and opening up programme from the late 1970s, policy towards ethnic minorities – all this and more were formed by what some in China thought the Russians were doing right or wrong.

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin toast, March 21, 2023. Image: Screengrab/SCMP video/Youtube

But many in China may wonder how much they have in common with Russia today. Presidents Putin and Xi Jinping certainly have a conservative, Western-skeptical, and pro-state couple.elective affinities.”

But Xi’s war against corruption and the Chinese Communist Party’s “gun command”, as Chairman Mao put it, mean real differences.

The Chinese will probably be proud of their own system, where such a mutiny is hard to imagine, but they will nevertheless be careful not to crow about it.

Joseph Torigian is Assistant Professor of International Services, American College School of International Service

Torigian does not work for, consult with, own stock in, or receive funding from any company or organization that could benefit from this article, and has not disclosed any relevant affiliations outside of their academic tenure.

This article has been republished from The conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Similar:

Like it Loading…

Dissecting China’s Response to the Wagner Rebellion

Asia Region News ,Next Big Thing in Public Knowledg

Share This Article
Exit mobile version
slot ilk21 ilk21 ilk21