In 1893, the Afghan administration struck a deal with British colonizers, selling off parts of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, along with its populace and future generations for an annual payment of 700,000 rupees. In 1947, these regions chose to accede to Pakistan.
In October of that same year, Afghanistan rescinded its earlier negative vote, originally cast in September 1947, concerning Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations (UN). Following this diplomatic gesture, both nations exchanged ambassadors in 1948. Sardar Shah Wali Khan, Afghanistan’s then ambassador to Pakistan, was also reported to have affirmed that whatever claims Afghanistan may have had on Pashtun-majority areas in Pakistan, it would now relinquish such claims in favor of Pakistan.
Despite these initial positive developments, Afghan administrations’ aspiration to create ‘Lar ao bar yao Afghan’ (Greater Afghanistan), by reclaiming territories ceded to British India through the Durand Line Agreement of 1893, continues to dominate and antagonize Pak-Afghan relations.
This narrative has served as a rallying point for nearly all Afghan rulers, spanning the royal regimes to communist leadership, from religious fundamentalists to the ostensibly liberal factions, and currently, the de facto Taliban regime. Each has invoked the Durand Line saga for their domestic political agendas.
Here in Pakistan, the Pashtun rights and justice movement, known as the Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM), has also engaged in this discourse, often adopting similar rhetoric.
Nevertheless, a comprehensive assessment of the validity of these claims through the lenses of international law, history, demographics, and Pashtun aspirations is necessary. In the next section, we will delve into this examination.
From an international law perspective, Afghanistan’s stance on the Durand Line lacks merit. According to Article 11 of the Vienna Convention, to which Afghanistan is a signatory, border agreements regarding international boundaries remain unaffected even after their inheritance by successor states.
Thus, Pakistan, as a successor state to Britain (British India), has inherited all the legal rights and responsibilities that Britain previously exercised with regard to the Durand Line.
Furthermore, member countries of the UN, including all Islamic countries, China, the United States and Great Britain, have also recognized the Durand Line as a legitimate international border.
Apart from that, from a historical standpoint, it is noteworthy to mention that the Pashtun belt in Eastern Afghanistan, encompassing regions such as Helmand, Kandahar, Paktika, Paktia, Nuristan, Nangarhar, Kunar, Khost, Zabul, and Nimroz, was historically part of the Indus Valley Civilization, which was centered in what is now Pakistan.
Demographically, the situation presents a similar context. Approximately 40 million Pashtuns live in Pakistan, while only an estimated 15 to 17 million inhabit Afghanistan. This demographic evidence reinforces the notion that a significant majority of Pashtuns currently live within Pakistani borders.
Significantly, the influx of Afghan nationals into Pakistan, driven by a desire for employment, business opportunities, quality healthcare, education, and other amenities, is a testament to their preference for Pakistan over Afghanistan as a destination for a better quality of life.
As the world turns its attention to Afghanistan, the country, currently, is grappling with a myriad of challenges, including terrorism, human rights violations and widespread poverty, which are having far-reaching consequences that extend beyond its borders, impacting the entire region.
Recently, Ambassador Usman Jadoon, Pakistan’s permanent representative to the United Nations, addressed the UN Security Council, stating, “Terrorism within and from Afghanistan poses the single most serious threat to the country, to the region, and the world.”
Earlier, the 15th ISIL (Daesh) and Al-Qaeda/Taliban United Nations monitoring report highlighted that the proscribed Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has become the largest terrorist group operating in Afghanistan, enjoying operational and logistical support from both the Afghan Taliban and various factions of the Al-Qaeda network.
The report further noted a concerning escalation in TTP-led assaults against Pakistan, rising sharply from 573 incidents in 2021 to 715 in 2022, and reaching 1,210 in 2023, with this trend showing no signs of abating into 2024.
While Pakistan remains committed to engaging in constructive dialogue with Afghanistan to mitigate the threats posed by terrorism from its western neighbor, the Taliban leadership appears unfazed about allaying Pakistan’s security concerns and denies harbouring terrorist outfits on its soil.
Although, Pakistan’s security forces and law enforcement agencies are resolutely dedicated to eradicating the scourge of terrorism within the country’s borders; nevertheless, enhanced measures are required to address the longstanding security threat that emanates from Afghanistan.
Given the historical, demographic, and personal aspirations of the Pashtun communities on both sides of the border, the question arises: would it not be prudent to consider the integration of the Pashtun belt in Eastern Afghanistan with Pakistan?
Certainly, the plight of Afghan brothers and sisters suffering under the oppressive rule of the Taliban resonates deeply with the people of Pakistan. Besides, it is worth noting that no nation is keener than Pakistan to support and witness improvements in the lives of Afghans.
Encouragingly, recent predictions from Goldman Sachs, a prominent American multinational investment bank and financial services provider, suggest that Pakistan could emerge as the world’s sixth-largest economy by 2075, with projections indicating a GDP of $12.7 trillion and a per capita income of $27,100.
Given this promising outlook, combined with the lack of prospects for stability in Afghanistan —given its history of internal conflicts and civil unrest —the integration of Eastern Afghanistan with Pakistan could offer a beneficial solution for Pashtun communities on both sides of the border, potentially bringing greater stability and prosperity to the region.This approach would not only fulfill the aspirations of both populations but also align with the PTM’s demand for a more unified Pashtun identity.
