Global Courant 2023-04-13 17:56:34
Classified Pentagon Documents leaked last week painted a grim picture of the course of the war in Ukraine. While it may be the biggest breach of national security since the Snowden leaks of US National Security Agency material a decade ago, the fact that the leak occurred is almost certainly more important than what was revealed about Ukraine.
The leak reveals how evidently it was easy for a low-ranking employee on a US military base to obtain and then share highly sensitive US government information. In comparison, the contents of the leaked documents on Ukraine are much less explosive – they mostly confirm existing battlefield assessments that sow doubtin the eyes of US intelligence officials, about any major breakthroughs in a widely anticipated Ukrainian spring offensive.
The main shortcomings on the Ukrainian side – artillery pieces and ammunition, as well as air defense – have been rectified. known for some time. What has also been clear for some time, and reaffirmed in some leaked documents, is that Ukraine is largely trusting on Soviet-era artillery material and ammunition supplies are starting to run out.
At the same timeWestern equipment has been slow to arrive and the training of the Ukrainian armed forces has taken time. And the Western capacity to produce more shells than current Ukrainian consumption has yet to be built.
Leopard 2A4 tanks in Zaragoza, Spain waiting to be sent to Ukraine. Photo: EPA-EFE via The Conversation / Javier Cebollada
Add to this delays in training and equipping the troops needed for a counter-offensive and the likelihood of a well-established Russian defense. The low expectations of at best modest territorial gains in a Ukrainian spring offensive comes as no surprise.
The equally limited gains made by Russia during its offensive in recent months, including around the still-disputed city Bakhmut should serve as an indication of what is and what is not possible after more than a year of war. Similarly, the protracted battle for Soledar in January this year already gave a glimpse of how precious even minimal and strategically insignificant gains in this war have become.
The flip side of the US assessment that a Ukrainian counter-offensive is unlikely to be a turning point in the war is that the fighting Get on beyond this year. In some estimatesit could take much longer.
There are no signs that either side is willing to give up. US casualty estimates — among the Pentagon leaks — point to more than 40,000 Russian soldiers killed in the past year and another 180,000 wounded.
On the Ukrainian side, the numbers are lower – with probably 17,500 killed and 113,500 injured – but still significant. Both countries now have tightened conscription rules and procedures in another sign that they are gearing up for an intensification of combat.
Equally important from a Ukrainian perspective is the continued support of Western partners. Despite the logistical difficulties of ramping up defense industry production and supplies to Ukraine, there is no indication that supplies will fall critically short and expose Ukraine to the risk of major defeats on the battlefield.
This is partly because Moscow also cannot muster the superior military capabilities it would take to inflict such defeats on Kiev.
With a lot of help from our friends: Volodymyr Zelensky during his visit to Poland, April 2023. Photo: EPA-EFE / Rafal Guz via The Conversation
Constant stalemate
So the strategic stalemate on grounds established late last year when Ukraine’s counter-offensive ended is likely to continue. Neither side can expect, at least not for now, to gain a decisive advantage.
Russia, according to to some of the leaked documents, has failed to secure significant foreign military aid. Moscow must therefore rely on a resurgent domestic defense industry that needs time to perform.
Military production will continue to be hampered by critical shortagesespecially from high-end semiconductors, which its main ally China has so far been unable and unwilling to supply.
Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko chair a joint meeting of the Supreme State Council of the Union State of Russia and Belarus in Moscow, April 2023. Photo: Sputnik / Kremlin Pool
However, Russia’s own military capabilities will increase over time. The country has enormous resources, including manpower. The economy is weakened, but not mortally wounded. And Putin seems no less in control of the country and its security apparatus, enabling him to suppress even the slightest domestic opposition and control the story of the war that keeps him in power.
However, these growing Russian capabilities can and will be matched by Ukraine and its Western partners. While there may be some uncertainty about the outcome and impact of the 2024 US presidential election, Ukraine continues to enjoy strong bipartisan support in the United States Congress and under the American audience.
Europe may not be fully aligned with the US over China, but there can be little doubt that the West is united in its support for Ukraine.
Ultimately, both parties will likely match each other’s capacity increases over time and the current stalemate will continue, albeit at a higher level of mutual attrition. And any increase in power, no matter how small, will reinforce the belief that this war remains winnable.
The Pentagon leaks have cast doubt on such assumptions, but have also confirmed that neither Washington nor Kiev contemplate losing the war on the battlefield or the negotiating table. Time will tell if this is a sustainable goal – and at what cost.
Stephen Wolff is Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham
This article has been republished from The conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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