Global Courant
On February 24, 2023, one year after Russia started its war of aggression against Ukraine, published a 12-point plan for the cessation of hostilities.
The plan called for respect for sovereignty, a ceasefire, peace negotiations, protection of civilians, humanitarian aid, abstinence from nuclear weapons, end of sanctions, refraining from arming the world economy and post-conflict reconstruction of Ukraine.
On June 3, during the Shangri-la dialogue, Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto gave a Peace plan of the Indonesian government.
Key elements of the plan include a ceasefire, the establishment of a demilitarized zone, the stationing of UN-mandated peacekeepers and the holding of a UN-organised referendum in disputed areas.
While Russia greeted both plans with sympathy, the Chinese proposal was met with skepticism in Ukraine and the West. Critics complained about its ambiguity. Prabowo’s plan fared even worse. Kiev found the proposal “strange” and argued that it resembled a “Russian plan”.
Western media ridiculed it as a ‘freelance’ stunt after it emerged that Prabowo presented the plan without informing President Joko Widodo or the Indonesian Foreign Ministry.
Indonesian President Joko Widodo and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky shake hands. Widodo reportedly did not investigate Prabowo’s peace proposal. Image: EAF
International reception of China’s and Prabowo’s proposals suggests that they will not pave the way for a lasting resolution of the conflict. Despite the futility of both plans, they convey hidden messages about how their proponents envision the future world order.
The most important message in the Chinese peace plan is the first point about sovereignty. Beijing’s stance is not surprising, given the incessantly repeated statements that the Westphalian standards of sovereignty in the UN Charter are the cornerstones of international law and leave no room for cosmopolitan legal reforms with tangible “behind-the-border” effects.
Non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries is a key tenet of the “Beijing Consensus”, which China uses to bring partners to justice, especially in the South. But why is China avoiding condemning the Russian invasion?
The answer lies in point two of the peace plan. It implicitly creates conditions that condone violations of international law. This is the case when countries seek security at the expense of others. In the Chinese reading, this is precisely the situation Russia faces with NATO’s eastward expansion.
With the entry of Eastern European countries, NATO membership has increased from 16 to 30 between 1999 and 2020. China follows Russia’s pre-war narrative: Moscow’s “special military operation” is a last resort in a dramatically deteriorating security environment. From this perspective, the United States and NATO are responsible for the war.
Such an argument is typical of great powers. It leaves unanswered the question of why Russia’s security should be rated higher than the security of its small Eastern European neighbours.
Centuries of Russian colonization and military interventions during the Soviet period have left these countries deeply traumatized as they enter the post-Cold War era. With its Near Foreign Policy, introduced shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia fueled these fears.
Near Abroad is a Russian policy to maintain influence in former Soviet republics and neighboring countries. The signal it sent to Russia’s Eastern European neighbors was that the resumption of Russian imperialism is always possible. The war against Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 confirmed these concerns.
Near Abroad forms a framework of military spheres of influence – a concept that conflicts with the immediate post-Cold War era and efforts to establish a more cooperative world order. Not joining NATO because of Russian reservations would have meant Eastern European countries endangering their own security for Russia’s security.
Indonesia voted on March 2, 2022 in favor of a UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But Prabowo’s recent proposal, like China’s position, fails to name the aggressor. It is trying to freeze the war, giving Russia the opportunity to revive its aggression.
Negotiations based on the current front line reward the aggressor.
Russian soldiers stand guard at the Kakhovka power station near Kherson. Photo: Twitter/EPA
They enable Russia to use its territorial gains as a bargaining chip. What can come out of a referendum in the disputed territories was amply demonstrated in September 2022, when Moscow forced the population in four Russian military-occupied Ukrainian oblasts to vote at gunpoint for the regions to join Russia.
The proposed referendum ignores the fact that under international law the territories occupied by Russia are part of Ukraine.
Prabowo’s proposal to start peace negotiations based on the military status quo differs from Ukrainian and Western calls for this to proceed through the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from occupied territories.
His peace plan mirrors widespread anti-American sentiment in the Indonesian public that dates back to the Sukarno era and was fueled by seemingly anti-Islamic US policies in the Middle East.
The mediations offered by China and Prabowo serve themselves. With its peace plan, China is seeking to ease international pressure to use its proximity to Russian President Vladimir Putin for mediation and present itself as a peace-seeking alternative to the war-mongering United States.
This is a concept that resonates well in the Global South. Prabowo’s proposal is a thinly veiled attempt to improve his chances in the 2024 presidential election. He exploited Indonesia’s mediation skills, regularly exercised since the Suharto era, to promote ambitions to join the club of great powers with claims to world leadership.
Because of their NATO-focused view of the war, the Chinese government and Prabowo are ignoring it Putin’s other story. Putin portrays Ukraine as a historical mistake, an integral part of Russia – meaning it has no legitimate state.
The silence of China and Prabowo about these distortions of history and the ethno-nationalist dimensions of the war seems like a re-legitimization of old conceptions of international politics.
So their rhetoric for a new international order, free of Cold War mentality, rings hollow. It relies on a traditional big power lens informed by political realism.
Jurgen Ruland is Professor Emeritus at the Department of Political Science at the University of Freiburg, Germany.
This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and has been republished under a Creative Commons license.
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