Global Courant
At the 2018 ASEAN Summit, former Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison argued that “our relationships with (US and China) are different, and they are both successful. Australia does not have to choose and we will not choose.”
But within two years, Australia found itself resolutely choosing to join the United States.
At the same summit in 2018, Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong took a less categorical approach to choose a party. He said: “I think it is very desirable that we don’t have to choose sides, but there may be circumstances where ASEAN has to choose one or the other. I hope it doesn’t happen anytime soon.”
Since then, competition between the US and China has only intensified. Australia’s “push comes to shove” choice was never in doubt, as it has fought alongside the United States in every post-1945 war in which the United States has been involved. But this is not the case for ASEAN states.
ASEAN countries are being pulled in different directions – and their alignment may be up for grabs. No ASEAN state willannoying choicesbetween China and the United States. But it’s instructive to see how they currently stand between the two warring powers.
In an ongoing study,”The Anatomy of Choice: Southeast Asia among the superpowersexperts were invited to monitor the alignment of ASEAN members over time. Preliminary assessments of interactions with the two superpowers since 2014 suggest that Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar lean heavily towards China, while Singapore and the Philippines are closer to the United States.
Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and US President Joe Biden walk to the Oval Office at the White House in Washington, DC. Photo: Twitter/Screengrab/Pool
These countries probably do not see their existing positions as ‘difficult’. Given their geography, perception of economic opportunity, and history of military procurement, their alignment seems natural and has served them well.
These countries’ fear of not wanting to choose isn’t so much about maintaining strategic equilibrium between the two superpowers, but more about not drastically changing where they are today.
Among these five states are the classic hedgers: Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei and Thailand. These are the countries whose alignments can be convincing.
The current positions of the ASEAN countries are not fixed. A questionnaire yearly fluctuations in how ASEAN would choose if forced to join the United States or China.
Comparing general ASEAN sentiment between 2022 and 2023, the survey found a slight increase among those in favor of joining the United States, from 57 to 61%.
Particularly interesting are the country-specific results. The opinion of the elite in Cambodia and Laos changed dramatically in favor of the United States between 2022 and 2023. Less drastic shifts towards China were seen in Myanmar, Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia.
Judging by the opinion of the elite, the state of affairs remains in flux. Like a former Singaporean ambassador joked the United States: “The United States should not be asking Asian countries to choose. You may not like the results if you ask countries to choose.”
There are several key factors that are likely to determine ASEAN states’ choices. In terms of providing economic opportunities, China wins. With geography, continental Southeast Asia should face China, while maritime Southeast Asia faces the United States.
When it comes to domestic politics, there is a general preference for the superpower that is agnostic about political systems, namely China. US endurance estimation is another consideration. Most investigations conclude that general preferences tend to favor China.
Chinese President Xi Jinping and Vietnamese leader Nguyen Phu Trong agree on many things. Image: China Daily
During the Cold War, countries opted for a large-scale approach, often based on ideological affinity. Maritime Southeast Asia chose the United States and the West, and the mainland states joined China and the Soviet Union.
But today Southeast Asia seems to be taking a more fragmented approach: ASEAN states are buying Chinese or American initiatives as they see fit.
Chinese initiatives include the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank, the Belt and Road Initiative and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. China’s more recent proposals such as the Global Development, Global Security and Global Civilization Initiatives also suggest active and targeted outreach to the world.
US initiatives include the aborted Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.
If Southeast Asian countries take a fragmented approach to choosing from these available options, China appears to offer more extensive and substantive growth opportunities. For all its problems, the Belt and Road Initiative offers more incentive than the US-led programs.
Even during the Covid-19 pandemic, China managed to “Achieve a vaccine diplomacy victoryin Southeast Asia by the rapid delivery of its Sinovac and Sinopharm vaccines, despite the greater efficacy of US-donated mRNA vaccines.
Over time, Southeast Asian countries could discover that they have inadvertently linked their economic and strategic fortunes to one side.
Still, all is not lost for those eager to reverse this momentum. The United States’ recent experience with Pacific countries suggests that the Global South retains considerable goodwill and trust in the West.
By stepping up its game in response to China’s efforts to woo Pacific nations, the Biden administration in September 2022 advanced a US-Pacific partnership. China’s attempt to establish a more ambitious regional partnership in May 2022 failed.
The challenge is undoubtedly greater in Southeast Asia. The resources that the United States and its allies will have to contribute are of a very different magnitude given the competition.
Yuen Foong Khong is Li Ka Shing Professor of Political Science at Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore.
This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and has been republished under a Creative Commons license.
Similar:
Loading…
