Global Courant
Stranded in the deteriorating East Asian security environment, South Korea is witnessing unprecedented turbulence. The nuclear buildup in North Korea has baffled the South Korean security elite.
While policy options have been floated to reduce South Korea’s insecurity, measures to change the status quo could increase Seoul’s vulnerability and expose it to strong backlash from adversaries.
A premature statement pursue the nuclear option would stoke”incentives for aggressionfrom regional actors, potentially inciting China and North Korea to retaliate. China has previously responded to South Korean attempts to strengthen its defenses by imposing economic sanctions.
If the South Korean elites decide to pursue nuclear weapons, it could lead to stricter measures from Beijing – one possibility is coercion and blackmail to dissuade South Korea from its nuclear efforts.
Beijing’s expansion of its nuclear arsenal is a manifestation of its coercive ploy to suppress Washington’s allies, such as South Korea. It tries drive a wedge in the alliance, possibly”disconnectionthem. If Seoul’s desire for a bomb materializes, it will only accelerate Beijing’s aggressive moves.
While South Korea rarely strives to balance China, its attempt to neutralize the North Korean threat is misunderstood in Beijing due to paranoia about US intentions. North Korea’s unabated eruption to develop nuclear weapon delivery systems and missiles complicate South Korea’s security environment.
If Seoul declares itself a nuclear-weapon state, Pyongyang’s warning to retaliate by using nuclear weapons may gain ground – something South Korea is not equipped to handle.
A THAAD interceptor is being tested in Kodiak, Alaska on July 11, 2017. Photo: Leah Garton / Missile Defense Agency / Handout
The long awaited U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, deployed in the far south of South Korea against North Korean intermediate and medium-range ballistic missiles, is not powerful enough to save Seoul. The native built Cheolmae-2 medium-range surface-to-air missile (KM-SAM) is full of technical loopholes.
Unless Seoul speeds up deployment from its “strategic command” to bolster its defenses against cruise and ballistic missile attacks under its “Three Axis” system, the call for nuclear development would only make Seoul more vulnerable.
resort to alternatives such as “nuclear sharingwith Washington doesn’t serve many purposes either. While “borrowing” a tactical nuclear weapon can signal alliance commitment, nuclear weapons stationed in South Korea would be more vulnerable to preemptive attacks.
For Washington, this could only be an attempt to appease Seoul. But unless Washington shows its intent to defend Seoul, these weapons will serve as no deterrent to South Korea.
In the 1970s, the government of former President Park Chung-hee failed to calm down its insecurity, even when US tactical nuclear weapons were on South Korean soil. Such as the administration of former US President Richard Nixon reduced US troops in South Korealeaving the US became clear.
Seoul realized the futility of “extraterritorial nuclear deployment”, leading to calls for indigenous nuclear armaments. Fears about the credibility and determination of the US alliance have gained momentum since the administration of former US President Donald Trump.
The Washington Declaration of 2023 – set to redeem US trustworthiness – never explicitly stated establishing deterrence through nuclear retaliation, a crucial point that South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol misinterpreted.
The declaration was intended to improve “discussions within the alliance on nuclear matters.” But in the end it was more of a comforting gesture from Washington, emphasizing Washington’s desire to reassure Seoul.
Even token appearances of U.S. strategic assets on the Korean peninsula, rather than discouraging North Korea, would only increase its insecurity. The expectations around the the sailing of the US Ohio Class SSBN are misplaced, as nuclear assets deployed nearby will cause Pyongyang to take them seriously, leading it to respond more aggressively.
None of Seoul’s remarkable policy options work in its favour. Going nuclear would dampen the alliance with Washington, while hosting US tactical nuclear weapons would increase the likelihood of pre-emptive strikes. Promises of expanded deterrence by the US do not oblige the US to answer its rhetoric.
The solution lies in strictly maintaining the status quo and avoiding deep US involvement, such as the use of US strategic assets.
Token pledges through the Washington Declaration serve such a purpose. While it makes sense to reassure allies by promising better regional security outcomes through deeper engagement, which Seoul also favors, such a choice is imprudent as it would lead to negative provocations from Northern Korea and China.
Washington’s role as balancing device off the coast is optimal. Strengthen Seoul relations with Japan can bolster South Korea’s conventional defensive capabilities without prodding North Korea and China and maintain the status quo.
People in Seoul watch a television news program featuring file footage of a North Korean missile test on January 1, 2020. Photo: Global Courant Files / AFP / Jung Yeon-je
Even if Pyongyang goes into a spiral in response to South Korea’s attempts at balancingthe significant US presence in South Korea would force Washington to respond.
In the face of a negative response from North Korea, any US abandonment of Seoul will cost the United States its reputation as Seoul’s security guarantor and devastate its alliances in the region, weakening its efforts to counter China .
The existing alliance arrangement between the US and South Korea is optimally set. South Korean attempts to secure itself with nuclear weapons would cause instability. Seoul’s security instead lies in incremental steps to improve its defensive capability.
Rahul Jaybhay is a PhD student at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and affiliated with the Asia Society Policy Institute, New Delhi.
Anondeeta Chakraborty is a postgraduate student at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and has been republished under a Creative Commons license.
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