The events of 1971 remain one of the most significant yet misunderstood chapters in the history of South Asia. For over five decades, the prevailing narrative has been one of victimhood, with East Pakistan painted as the oppressed region and West Pakistan as the aggressor. But the story is far more complex, and it’s high time we reassess the historical context, motivations, and decisions that led to the disintegration of Pakistan. December 16, observed as Armed Forces Resolute Day in Pakistan, offers an opportunity to pay tribute to the valor of the soldiers who faced insurmountable odds during a crisis. It also challenges the myths that have pervaded the discourse surrounding the events of 1971, myths that South Asian historian have perpetuated to cast a shadow on the truth of what transpired.
The loss of East Pakistan did not occur due to the people’s will, nor was it the result of an inevitable push for independence. Instead, it was a calculated intervention by India, which saw an opportunity to reshape the region’s political landscape to its advantage. While the narrative has long painted India as a benevolent liberator, providing aid and military assistance to the Mukti Bahini, the truth reveals a much more troubling reality. India’s intervention was not one driven by altruism but by strategic interests aimed at weakening Pakistan and asserting its regional dominance. This intervention, designed to foster instability and drive a wedge between East and West Pakistan, has been largely overlooked in the discourse surrounding the 1971 conflict.
At the heart of this narrative is the assumption that East Pakistan was economically exploited and politically oppressed by West Pakistan. The claim that the region was systematically deprived of development has been a key pillar of the argument for independence. However, a closer examination of the facts reveals a different story. Despite its relative underdevelopment compared to West Pakistan, East Pakistan received significant investment and attention from the central government. The Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC), the Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation (PICIC), and the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan (IDBP) all played crucial roles in fostering industrial growth in the region. Under the leadership of President Ayub Khan, East Pakistan saw a rise in industrial output, with a significant portion of cabinet members and key officials hailing from the eastern wing. The development of infrastructure, from roads and railways to energy projects like the Kaptai Dam, was a testament to the central government’s commitment to improving the region’s economic standing.
Moreover, the industrialization of East Pakistan during the 1950s and 1960s cannot be dismissed. The region, mainly through its jute industry, became an economic powerhouse, with mills like Crescent, Ispahani, and Adamjee playing pivotal roles in local employment and global trade. The Chittagong Port’s development and initiatives in agriculture, energy, and telecommunications helped transform the region into a bustling economic hub. While it is true that there were disparities in development between East and West Pakistan, these were not the result of deliberate neglect by the central government but rather the legacy of historical economic structures and challenges that predated the creation of Pakistan.
The claim that Urdu was imposed as the national language at the expense of regional languages is another myth that deserves scrutiny. While it is true that Urdu was declared the official language of Pakistan, this decision was not intended to marginalize regional languages like Bengali. Urdu, as the lingua franca of the Muslim population of India, was seen as a unifying force for the newly formed nation of Pakistan. It was a symbol of the Muslim world’s shared cultural and religious heritage, and its promotion as the national language was part of a broader effort to forge a cohesive identity for the state. The assertion that Urdu was imposed at the cost of Bengali and other regional languages overlooks the reality that Pakistan’s regional diversity was always a source of tension, and linguistic differences were only one facet of the broader political struggle.
Another cornerstone of the 1971 narrative is the portrayal of the Agartala Conspiracy as a fabrication designed to suppress legitimate aspirations for self-determination. The Agartala Conspiracy, which involved Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and other key figures of the Awami League, has long been presented as evidence of a plot to divide Pakistan. While the conspiracy is often depicted as a desperate effort to suppress the legitimate political rights of East Pakistan’s people, the reality is far more murky. The involvement of Indian intelligence agencies, particularly RAW, in fomenting unrest in East Pakistan cannot be overlooked. It is now widely acknowledged that the conspiracy was not solely the product of local discontent but rather a coordinated effort between Sheikh Mujib and Indian operatives designed to destabilize Pakistan and further India’s strategic goals in the region.
The myth of Sheikh Mujib as the “emancipator” of the Bengali people also deserves a more critical examination. While Mujib was seen as a symbol of resistance, particularly after his arrest and the subsequent political crisis, his leadership after the creation of Bangladesh tells a different story. Mujib’s focus, once in power, shifted from the welfare of the Bangladeshi people to consolidating his political dominance. Under his rule, corruption flourished, inflation soared, and political repression became the norm. The promise of an independent and prosperous Bangladesh quickly led to a dictatorship marked by mismanagement and a lack of accountability. Mujib’s reliance on India for military and political support further entrenched its dependence on its larger neighbor, undermining Bangladesh’s sovereignty.
In retrospect, the story of Bangladesh’s liberation is not as clear-cut as presented by both the Indian and Bangladeshi governments. The role of external forces in shaping the fate of East Pakistan cannot be denied, nor can the internal contradictions and challenges that plagued the region’s political leadership. As Bangladesh seeks to redefine its identity in the 21st century, it is crucial to engage with a more nuanced understanding of the events of 1971—one that acknowledges the complexities of the past and challenges the dominant narratives that have obscured the truth for far too long.
In Bangladesh today, there is a growing recognition among the youth that the story told by the political establishment does not align with their lived reality. There is a sense of disillusionment with the political cults that continue to control the narrative of the country’s past. Young Bangladeshis are increasingly rejecting the influence of foreign powers, particularly India, which has consistently interfered in the internal affairs of its neighbors. This shift in consciousness represents a breaking away from the indoctrination of previous generations and a desire to chart a more independent course. Bangladesh’s current political scenario reflects a more self-aware populace that is beginning to challenge the long-held myths about the 1971 war.
