Global Courant
In 2022, former Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi visited Myanmar, but did not meet with the regime’s leader, senior general Min Aung Hlaing.
On May 2, 2023, the general warmly welcomed Wang’s successor to Qin Gang. The minister expressed China’s support for the regime regardless of the situation and promised deeper economic cooperation. He further pledged to support Myanmar’s efforts “to maintain stability”.
In March 2021, China condemned the violence against civilians, cut investment and engaged in talks with exiled members of the National League for Democracy (NLD). This support changed dramatically in 2023 when China began a new diplomatic approach. On April 4, 2023, the secretary of the Yunnan Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Wang Ning, arrived in Naypyidaw.
Later that month, a CCP envoy met with former junta leader Than Shwe — now 90 years old — who had had closer relations with China than Min Aung Hlaing. The envoy also met former president Thein Sein. These meetings were aimed at asking the former leaders to advise Min Aung Hlaing, who is known to harbor certain anti-Chinese sentiments, to forge closer ties.
China’s strategy interweaves economic, political and military dimensions. Since the military coup, China has invested $113 million in Myanmar.
The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor forms an important economic link between the two countries. The plan for a high-speed rail line between Yunnan and Rakhine – which was shelved in 2014 – is now back on the table, as are a windmill project in Rakhine, a hydroelectric power station in Kachin state and a gas-fired power station.
For Myanmar, supplies of food, fertilizer and stable electricity are urgent, and China is addressing this through infrastructure. As of February 2023, the 770-kilometer Chinese-operated oil pipeline from Rakhine to Yunnan has been used to transport Russian oil to China. The pipeline starts at the deep-sea port in Kyaukphyu on Ramree Island and is very important to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Local residents’ houses in front of buildings of a Chinese oil pipeline project on Madae Island in Kyaukphyu, Myanmar. Photo: Facebook
Politically and militarily, China is concerned about the border regions, where fighting between Myanmar’s military and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) often results in both bombs and refugees on the Chinese side.
Qin visited the United Wa State Army, Kachin Independent Army, Arakan Army and other China-friendly northeastern EAOs before seeing Min Aung Hlaing. Qin has urged Yunnan to do so strengthen its border defenses.
China is concerned that the People’s Defense Force (PDF) will attack its investments in Myanmar. PDF attacked one of the stations on the pipeline in February 2022. In May 2023, a series of anti-Chinese protests erupted – reflecting increasing ones resentment towards Chinese investments for neglecting the local population and the environment. The resistance has called for a boycott of Chinese products.
There has also been speculation that China is help build a base on the 11 km long Great Coco Island, which is 300 kilometers away from Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal. The island has a radar station and an airfield.
Another sign of China’s offensive strategy in the region was a visit by Chinese diplomats to Bangladesh to speed up the repatriation of Rohingya refugees, despite poor conditions in the Rakhine settlement camps.
The strategy in Myanmar is also part of China’s efforts to counter US influence in the region. The United States Burma Act of 2021 will provide support for the government of national unity and the resistance. This may have convinced China to support Min Aung Hlaing.
Chinese envoys are not allowed to meet Aung San Suu Kyi and China is not happy with the NLD ban. Despite these concerns, a strategic triad alliance between China, Russia and Myanmar is on the rise. Perhaps this is an easy relationship for the three partners, but it is viewed cynically by the citizens of Myanmar.
Demonstrations to have intensified and the pipeline has been attacked three times since Qin’s visit. The parallel government of National Unity has declared Chinese investment illegal. For Min Aung Hlaing, the alliance is a matter of survival. Urgently in need of economic, political and military support, he has chosen to ignore resentment of increased Chinese influence.
Myanmar’s coup maker Senior General Min Aung Hlaing attends the 9th Moscow Conference on International Security in Moscow, Russia on June 23, 2021. Photo: AFP via Anadolu Agency/Sefa Karacan
Meanwhile, Chen Hai, China’s ambassador to Myanmar, met with Myanmar’s interior minister and urged him to take tough action the internet fraud and gambling center Shwe Kokko run by Chinese criminals on the Thai border. The ambassador urged Myanmar to rescue the people trafficked and detained by Shwe Kokko.
But their headquarters is guarded by the Army’s Border Guard Forces, who have interests in the company. China clearly wants Min Aung Hlaing to take control of matters affecting Chinese interests before sending an invitation for an official visit to Beijing.
The military uses it Russian fighter planes and helicopters to bomb civilians, while troops burn down villages and kill civilians. The resistance lacks a firm coherent command, needs more international aid and is dependent on EAOs opposing the regime. But the resistance will not give up until there is substantial change.
Any mediation seems impossible and the generals are used to dealing with it international sanctions. China’s support for Min Aung Hlaing is bad for the resistance and the humanitarian crisis.
If China’s support for Myanmar continues to be driven by its desire to serve its own interests, prospects for changing the situation will remain dim.
Mikael Gravers is Associate Professor Emeritus in the School of Culture and Society of the Department of Anthropology at Aarhus University.
This article was originally published by East Asia Forum and has been republished under a Creative Commons license.
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