Global Courant 2023-05-22 16:42:53
For more than three decades, Moscow and Beijing have gradually strengthened their partnership. The growing number of potentially conflicting interests, for example on investment and exploration in the Arctic regionhave not slowed down cooperation.
Despite Russia being China’s”junior partnerWhile Beijing’s economic and global strength has grown over the past decade, their relationship remains strong. Pushing back against American power is a constant motivator for both nations.
But if Russian President Vladimir Putin ceased to play a leading role, would the relationship fall apart? A change of leadership in Moscow is likely to complicate Russian-Chinese cooperation, but not because of ideological shifts in Russian politics or geopolitical realignments on the world stage.
The prospects for democratizing Russia or improving relations with the West are the bleakest in the past two decades. It is Russian domestic politics that will most likely play an important role in determining the direction of future relations between the two countries.
Any change in the Kremlin is likely to upset a delicate balance in Russia political and economic ecosystem and would lead to a new round of internal struggles for influence and resources.
While deepening cooperation with Beijing, Moscow signed a number of agreements that were less than optimal from the perspective of the Russian state, but which strengthened the positions of Putin’s allies and collaborators.
In return, they created a powerful pro-Chinese lobby in the Kremlin’s corridors. Without Putin’s patronage, these business empires could be targeted by those surrounding a new leader, if they want to have more diverse business partners abroad.
The Kremlin. Photo: Shutterstock via The Conversation
Moreover, the Russians who have supported ever closer cooperation with China cannot be taken for granted. If China decided to enlist wolf-warrior diplomacy (a confrontational technique that resists criticism of Beijing’s government) in Russia, it could alienate those who were formerly allies.
Some Russian scholars already warned about this before the war in Ukraine. An escalation of Chinese cyber, industrial and traditional espionage practices — a temptation that might be irresistible to a stronger partner — would prompt Russian intelligence agencies to crack down on Chinese technology with potential surveillance capabilities.
A new leader would have a chance to reassess the extent of Russia’s dependence on China and the broader context of Russia’s policy in Asia. It is worth remembering that Russia already tried in the mid-2000sturn to the east”, no turn to China.
Russia’s Asian policy was to be balanced and diversified, focusing on cooperation with China, Japan, Korean states and Southeast Asian countries. Oil and gas pipelines were intended to serve Asian customers, not just China.
Meanwhile China has bought the lion’s share of oil sent to Russia’s Asian terminal in Kozmino. The Gas pipeline Power of Siberia and its potential second branch only go to China, making it impossible for Russia to start exporting gas directly to other customers such as South Korea.
The participation of Russian aircraft and ships in joint patrols around Japan is beneficial to Beijing, but it limits Moscow’s room for maneuver to forge other Asian allies and makes it dependent on Chinese policies.
Domestic view
Domestic politics in Russia has created favorable circumstances for close cooperation with China. But the regime’s survival considerations affect the Kremlin’s assessment China’s growing power and lead it to neglect the growing asymmetry in relations with Beijing.
The Russian elite does not view China as a threat to the regime’s security and survival. Therefore, it is easier for Moscow to interpret China’s rise to superpower as friendly and accept its growing global role, even if it makes Russia a minor partner.
Image: OEC via The Conversation
The financial and political benefits of the partnership by individual members of the Russian elite were another Director for relations with Beijing. Not everyone is as enthusiastic about collaboration as Igor Sechinhead of the state oil company Rosneft, for which China is the most important partner.
But even companies that compete with their Chinese counterparts, such as Russia’s state-owned nuclear power company Rosatom, still benefit from a presence in the Chinese market.
No doubt the hands of a new Russian leader would be tied to a great extent. Oil and gas pipelines leading to China connect Russian companies to this market and cannot be easily replaced. China’s selective support has consolidated the pro-Beijing orientation of Russia’s major players.
Even before the war in Ukraine, Beijing helped some companies bypass the barriers of Western sanctions by offering advance payments for oil deliveries or granting loans. A large part of the Russian elite sees China as the only partner against the West.
Nevertheless, any new leader will have a chance to re-evaluate the costs and benefits of close ties with Beijing, and it will be in their interest to do so if it can strengthen their position.
Marcin Kaczmarski is a lecturer in Security Studies, University of Glasgow
This article has been republished from The conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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