As a general practice, regulation plays a significant role in fostering a comfortable and safe environment in each system. Particularly, in the case of nuclear energy, regulation contributes in the standardization of technical safety precautions and also maintains an alert eye in detecting operational or design flaws in the nuclear power plants. Acknowledging the importance of an immaculate regulation mechanism, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) advises that the safety regulator should be independent of the government as well as any other institution to permit autonomous decision-making based only on safety principles and free from political interference.
Despite repeated emphasis on the importance of regulation mechanisms by international atomic energy watchdogs, India lacks the crucial component of strict security measures carried out by a separate nuclear regulatory authority. The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) of India, which is in charge of regulating nuclear energy, is not impartial in its role or operations. It is part of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), which oversees the country’s nuclear programs. Due to this, it is extremely doubtful that AERB would have the authority to halt any activities carried out by DAE, even if it found instances of non-compliance with the established international standards. Along with the IAEA, critics within India have expressed grave worries about India’s rapidly expanding nuclear program and the lack of strict security and safety protocols. For instance, the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India issued a warning on the AERB and DAE’s relationship and the loopholes in nuclear security.
It is crucial to remember that maintaining nuclear security is a national duty. The international community, notably adjacent states, have legitimate worries since nuclear threats and the possible effects of nuclear terrorism may transcend the state’s boundaries. Because the transboundary spread of radioactivity in the event of a nuclear mishap may immediately affect the whole region, Pakistan has often cited many security flaws in India’s nuclear facilities. The lack of strict security measures may give terrorist organizations and like-minded groups the confidence to get nuclear material for personal gain or use it in acts of terrorism. Such a scenario would have extremely severe results on entire international community. India’s appropriate integration into the international non-proliferation framework, such as participation in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), should thus be conditioned on New Delhi’s capacity to simplify its nuclear security procedures. The impending Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) review meeting should exert more moral pressure on India to take greater responsibility for its nuclear program and make India answerable for all nuclear trafficking incidents.
According to a report published by Kashmir Media Service, when the Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority (NSRA) Bill was introduced in the Indian Parliament in September 2011, a feeble effort was made to soothe the concern of the world community in this respect. The report showed serious concerns over India’s irresponsible behavior and highlighted the BJP government’s disregard for the most important safety safeguard. The creation of a regulatory body would undoubtedly enhance India’s nuclear security formulation. India would continue to represent a nuclear theft threat to the international community in the absence of an adequate security framework. The first ever nuclear smuggling incident was recorded in 1994 when Meghalaya police seized 2.4kg of uranium from a gang of smugglers, similarly in 1998 two incidents happened, one incident in 2001, in 2003 when the nuclear material was caught through terror outfits, in 2006 material was stolen from a research lab and sequence of nuclear trafficking incidents till date. Overall, nearly 200 kg of radioactive material has been stolen in India over the past 20 years. Among other important incidents, the most recent couple of incidents that occurred in May and June 2021 in a sequence were disastrous and raised serious concerns over India’s nuclear security and safety measures also over the credibility of Indian intelligence agencies because, in both incidents, the material was theft to sell in black market.
On the other hand, Pakistan has a command and control system that is more effective and reliable than India’s in terms of ensuring the safety and efficient use of its nuclear resources. The National Command Authority (NCA) was founded in 2000 to serve as the nuclear command and control decision-making body. The state’s prime minister is in charge of the NCA. The Foreign, Defense, Interior, and Finance Ministers, the Director General of the Strategic Plans Division, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Navy, and Air Force make up the core group of members who are responsible for handling nuclear materials. The nuclear command and control mechanism in Pakistan is regarded as being fairly advanced and well-balanced. There are safeguards and checks between the participation of institutions, as well as civilian and military participation. The safe and centralized command authority is an important component of Pakistan’s command and control system. Pakistan’s Nuclear weapon system guarantees a civilian-controlled system that maintains the greatest level of accountability while taking into account political and strategic factors.
On strategic level, through “Credible Minimum Deterrence,” Pakistan maintains a stance of “Full Spectrum Deterrence.” This policy highlights Pakistan’s determination to thwart any type of attack by having a reliable nuclear deterrent. It includes several factors, like clearly defined command authority, safe and dependable communication networks, and employee reliability initiatives. Despite regular armed provocations by India, Pakistan has reaffirmed time and time again that “nuclear use authority shall remain under centralized control under all circumstances.” Pakistan has no plans to give the field officers control over Tactical Nuclear Weapons.
Pakistan is dedicated to international nuclear security. It actively takes part in global conferences and activities involving nuclear security, non-proliferation, and counterterrorism. Pakistan demonstrates its responsible handling of nuclear weapons, commitment to preventing their proliferation, and measures to protect against unauthorized access through collaboration with the international community. The country’s efforts to assure security and deterrence are clear indications of its commitment to maintaining a strong nuclear command and control organization. Moreover, Pakistan’s multi-layered strategy, which includes a secure command structure, strong physical security, initiatives to ensure the trustworthiness of its employees, and efficient communication networks, demonstrates its dedication to protecting the security and safety of its nuclear assets.
