Global Courant
After the end of the Cold War, the South Caucasus, the Caspian Sea Basin and Central Asia became areas of practical policy focus for Western geopolitical strategists, who recognized their importance to international affairs beyond the rich energy resources of the region. At the end of the first decade of the new century, however, an interruption of this strategic engagement began.
Now, a decade and a half later, interest from the US State Department and Washington policymakers and advisers has reignited, accompanied by a new European outreach that has hitherto been subdued.
Against the backdrop of intensified diplomatic and economic exchanges between China and the five Central Asian countries, as illustrated the recent high-profile summit in Xian has steadily increased the significance of the Middle Corridor stretching across the Caspian Sea in recent years.
Less noticed was the second EU-Central Asia Economic Forum held in Almaty at the same time as the meeting in Xian. So the European Union has signLED the recognition of the Middle Corridor as a potential counterweight to dependence on Russian-dominated infrastructure.
The meeting in Almaty is an indicator of the EU’s strategic policy direction, adopted by the Council of the European Union in June 2019, to strengthen closer ties with Central Asian countries.
This strategic policy focuses on resilience, including border security and the environment; on prosperity, especially “sustainable connectivity”; and on the promotion of regional cooperation.
Roll of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan
This emerging focus from the West crosses the strategic vision advocated by two key countries, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. That is because these states, crucial to the implementation of the Middle Corridor, have tried to promote the autonomous development of the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
Azerbaijan in particular has played an important role, given its geographic hub between Europe and Asia, and its status as a crucial transport and logistics fulcrum within the Middle Corridor structure.
The main catalyst for the operational launch of the Middle Corridor has been the active bilateral cooperation between the two countries since 2017. This bilateral cooperation has since reframed into a plurilateral platform to promote regional development and contribute to the transformation of the geo-economic landscape. The Middle Corridor has evolved from a geo-economic blueprint to a politically important transit route.
Transformations of international trade patterns after Russia’s resurgence of war against Ukraine have underlined the importance of the Middle Corridor. Evidence of its increasing significance is visible in quantitative terms, with freight volume along the Middle Corridor experienced a doubling in the past year alone, even this remains relatively low in absolute terms.
Chinese aspirations
The prevailing narrative that portrays the Middle Corridor as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative misunderstands Beijing’s view and ignores its own specific strategic dimension. In reality, China’s commitment to the Middle Corridor pales in comparison to the resources it has devoted to other transit routes (the northern route through Russia and the southern maritime route) that are integral to the BRI.
The continued progress of the Middle Corridor, despite obstacles, is actually indicative of the broader South Caucasus-Central Asia region’s drive for political and economic autonomy.
Despite commendable progress in the development of critical infrastructure, such as that of Azerbaijan creation of the modern multimodal port of Alat, the Western powers’ recognition of the strategic significance of this route has not yet translated into commensurate support for its extension. This would require a deeper strategic commitment from the Western powers, accompanied by increased multilateral investment.
If developed in a timely manner, the Middle Corridor will have the potential to serve as a conduit for the emancipation of Central Asia from Russia’s influence as it continues to decline in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine.
Russia’s historical tendency to put pressure on Central Asian countries through military threats and its control over energy markets could explain China’s reluctance to the Middle Corridor. At the Xian summit, for example, Beijing touted a long-planned route through Kyrgyzstan to Uzbekistan, from where theoretically further through northern Iran and Turkey to Europe.
Although the Trans-Caspian International Trade Route (TITR) – a wider project of which the Middle Corridor is the most important segment – was initially considered an alternative route for Chinese and possibly Southeast Asian goods to reach Europe, Beijing never seems to really considered the practice as part of the BRI.
In particular, Chinese investment in the TITR, and especially in the Middle Corridor, has lagged behind. This is because China mainly sees the Middle Corridor as a channel to expand its own influence in Central Asia.
It is hesitant to provide support that could lead to any challenge to its own position in the geopolitical balance. It tries to tilt the region in its own direction in other ways.
Changed circumstances offering new opportunities now give the TITR and the Middle Corridor the real potential to drive autonomous economic development and integration in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. This would be especially true for the South Caucasus, as Armenia grabs the current chance of a comprehensive peace treaty with Azerbaijan.
Western interests
Strategic moves by the West can strengthen trade flows through the Middle Corridor. These increased flows could ensure a reliable supply of essential raw materials to the EU while stimulating regional economic development and integration.
The ultimate result would be to stimulate the reconfiguration of the region’s economic geography in anticipation of the imminent disintegration and collapse of the current international system, which foreseeable in the early/mid 2040s.
In this long-term perspective, the Middle Corridor – arguably the backbone of the TITR – has the potential to establish the wider region, from the South Caucasus to Central Asia, as a relatively autonomous actor in world politics, that is, one that not only the object of the whims of great powers, but which can create its own circumstances.
Such a development would not only catalyze the fuller geo-economic transformation of the wider region – the South Caucasus, the Caspian Sea region and Central Asia – but would eventually also affect the reconfiguration of the global balance of power already in place. the corridor is.
That reconfiguration would reduce the encroaching hegemony of the New Triple Alliance of China, Iran and Russia. It would therefore be in the interests of Europe, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Indo-Pacific countries.
It follows that the Indo-Pacific nations should step up their efforts in support of the TITR and, initially, of the Middle Corridor.
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