Global Courant
Some political crises are difficult to predict. The one that broke out in Russia at the end of June was a few months in the making, but despite the public visibility of the conflict between mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin and Russia’s Ministry of Defense (MOD), it was hard to know how it would play out.
The militarized “march of justice” from Prigozhin to Moscow, which the Russians and the world followed in real time on June 24, was as shocking, unexpected and frightening as the mob attack on the US Capitol on January 6, 2020. other words. Russia is not unique in experiencing an attempted armed attack on its institutions of power.
But the Kremlin’s approach to the crisis was very different from the way the US government approached its own approach in 2020. In the US, we saw a massive public inquiry into the events of January 6, led by the House Select Committee. and included broadcasting public hearings and publishing an 800-page final report. About 1,000 people were charged with federal crimes related to the attack.
In Russia, President Vladimir Putin decided to make a deal with Prigozhin and send him into exile in Belarus, reportedly along with some of his mercenaries. Any further action that will be taken will likely take place behind the scenes, so observers will have to wait and see what the immediate consequences will be at the political level.
However, there are some long-term consequences that are already visible. Russia will continue to fight the war in Ukraine, but its troops will be under one command. It is clear that the Kremlin views the political spillover effects of runaway parallel structures as too costly.
It will prevent the emergence of another Prigozhin – an autonomous military operator that can act with rights and control military forces outside the command of the Ministry of Defense. Implementing the June 11 directive from Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to bring all private formations under his ministry will be the first step.
Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov’s Akhmat troops have already signed contracts with the Defense Ministry. Does this mean that the Kremlin has firmly established control over them?
If Putin’s authority is considered safe, Kadyrov is likely to behave. If not, he can become unpredictable. The Kremlin is aware of this and knows that the Caucasus is Russia’s most unstable region.
It is therefore no coincidence that Putin chose to visit Dagestan immediately after the mutiny and demonstrate his own popularity by appearing in public and attracting crowds of supporters – a PR exercise that was quite unusual for him. This was intended to counter any perception of his political weakness and to reassert his control over the Caucasus.
The Kremlin will continue to take various other measures – out of the public eye – to stabilize military command and dismantle Wagner’s structures and operations outside Russia. It will succeed in re-establishing centralized control over all armed forces, but that does not mean it survived Prigozhin’s failed mutiny unscathed.
Significant systemic challenges – some highlighted by the overly outspoken Prigozhin – remain and could further erode the authority of the Russian president and destabilize the Russian state.
The main one concerns the Russian army itself. Doubts about the ability to win the war in Ukraine inevitably grow in Russian society and among the elites. It is becoming increasingly clear that Russian forces at the front will not become more effective and that the only remaining options – launching a nuclear strike or damaging the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant – are not an acceptable way out of the war. .
Over the past year, Prigozhin repeatedly emphasized the incompetence of defense officials and the inefficiency of the military base. This message resonated with the Russian public. In the aftermath of the “march of justice,” nearly a third of Russians wanted Shoigu removed from his position as defense minister.
On top of dwindling support and confidence in the military, the Kremlin faces major economic challenges. It has had to reorient its economy towards military production and government procurement, leaving the private sector to its own devices and operating under increasingly difficult conditions. The collapsing ruble, the growing list of Western sanctions and the shrinking space for entrepreneurship are taking their toll.
The impoverishment of the Russian people is an inevitable outcome that has so far been temporarily mitigated by the increase in social benefits to the poorest and most vulnerable groups in society. But the Russian state’s ability to sustain these financial flows will diminish as the war continues and it faces a growing budget deficit and declining export revenues due to tougher Western sanctions.
From the current point of view, there is no optimistic scenario for the Kremlin. Unless a drastic change of direction takes place, the various pressures – socio-political, military and economic – will only pile up, causing fractures and eruptions of all kinds. Russia has not yet reached the proverbial “bottom”, but it is certainly experiencing the boomerang effect of the offensive war that the Kremlin recklessly decided to launch.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial view of Al Jazeera.
