Global Courant
When Vladimir Putin called for a partial mobilization in September 2022, it was a sign to ordinary Russians that – despite all the Kremlin’s denials – this was no longer a ‘special military operation’, but a real war.
In response to Ukraine’s successful counteroffensive, which recaptured parts of its territory from Russia, Putin called up about 300,000 troops – about 1% of the eligible pool of reservists.
The mobilization, which took place only once in Russia before last year (in 1941), differs from the country’s regular mobilization. conscription mechanismwhich annually calls on approximately a quarter of a million men aged 18 to 30 (the age limit was raised from 27 to 30 in April).
Conscripts are not allowed to fight outside Russia, but once they complete their one-year military service, they join the reserves and can be called up to fight.
But despite the enormous reserves on which the Kremlin can call, it is clear that, especially in the run-up to the next presidential elections in May 2024, a new round of calls would be deeply unpopular.
Yet there are persistent rumors that a new mobilization is imminent. This is partly a disinformation campaign launched by Kiev to sow dissent in Russia. In December 2022, then Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov and the head of military intelligence Kyrylo Budanov claimed that a new wave of mobilization would begin on January 5, 2023.
When this did not happen, Ukrainian officials continued to claim that half a million men would be mobilized in January. It warned eligible conscripts to flee Russia.
Again in September 2023, Ukrainian sources claimed a new mobilization was planned for the day after the Russian regional elections on September 10. Again nothing happened.
Spreading rumors about an impending mobilization in Russia is clearly part of Ukraine’s psychological warfare, but the more they do this without anything happening, the less credible it becomes.
And in fact, it is Ukraine that is under pressure to recruit enough troops as its counter-offensive struggles for momentum.
Changing moods
Unlike September 2022, the long-awaited spring and summer offensives in Kiev have not had the impact that many in the West had hoped for. In fact, the opposite is true, and so are the realists now talking down the prospect of a Ukrainian breakthrough in the short term.
It is a stark contrast to my visit to Russia in May, when the mood was somber and there were expectations of a new Ukrainian offensive against the backdrop of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s attack. increasingly hysterical videos claiming that the Russian army was a complete mess.
But this somber mood quickly disappeared film material of burning Ukrainian Leopard tanks and Bradley infantry fighting vehicles appeared in early June.
Daily life on the Russian home front adapts to the war. Alexander Titov/Queens University Belfast, author provided (no reuse). Image: The conversation
By the time I returned in August, the perception of the threat from Ukraine had disappeared Completely changed. In September even some pro-Ukrainian bloggers had to give in that the much-hyped offensive had little strategic impact.
Putin claims to have recruited another 300,000 volunteers in 2023. While some may have already signed up, more are joining us – like confirmed by Ukrainian intelligence. Thus, with a stable front and steady recruitment, there appears to be little need for the Kremlin to continue with what would be a deeply unpopular mobilization.
Russian pro-war bloggers complain that the country has refused to go into ‘total war’ mode. But if it is a prolonged war of attrition, as seems likely, maintaining normality is in fact a strength.
Russia does to increase its war production and the army also gains practical war experience that it clearly lacked in the initial phase. It could enter 2024 in better shape in terms of weapons, ammunition and troop experience.
So why would it resort to an unpopular mobilization when it can withstand anything Ukraine and its NATO allies can throw at them?
Tension on Ukraine
Expertsretired generals And Ukrainian And Western officials had high hopes for a decisive Ukrainian breakthrough towards the Sea of Azov.
The state of the conflict in Ukraine according to the Institute for the Study of War. Map: Institute for the Study of War
This summer, Ukraine and NATO suffered a likely strategic defeat in their attempt to end the war by military means. NATO countries supplied and trained Ukraine as best they could. And so far, at least, it has yielded virtually nothing.
To have another chance, Ukraine will have to mobilize even more troops and acquire more advanced weapons in greater quantities than ever before. But despite all the talk of Russian mobilization, Ukraine appears to be suffering from a manpower shortage.
Kiev is increasingly taking refuge draconian measures to get sufficient numbers forward. It’s recently extensive mobilization to previously exclude groups such as the partially disabled.
The recent one crackdown on corruption about military recruiters suggests that after eighteen months of war, the usual means of mobilization are no longer sufficient. It also indicates that many people are desperate to avoid mobilization and are willing to pay large bribes to do so. No wonder Ukrainian men of fighting age are not allowed to leave the country.
Equally worrying for Volodymyr Zelensky’s government are the potential political consequences of undermining support for the war effort if large numbers of people who do not want to fight are forced into uniforms. This will also affect Ukraine’s morale on the battlefield.
While Russia adjusts its own expenditure accordingly an unprecedented levelarming Kiev for another decisive advantage will cost much more than the $113 billion already published by the US alone.
Currently, the Biden administration is seeking approval for another $20 billion, which is already a tough sell in the Republican-controlled Congress. Meanwhile, Kiev’s European allies could not arm Ukraine on their own, even if they wanted to.
The bottom line is that Ukraine, which is completely dependent on outside support both financially and militarily, will find it difficult to sustain its war effort at current levels. Right now, Kiev, not Moscow, is under greater pressure.
Alexander Titov is a lecturer in modern European history, Queen’s University Belfast
Disclosure: Alexander Titov does not work for, consult with, own shares in, or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond his academic appointment.
This article is republished from The conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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