Global Courant
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s victory in Turkey’s unprecedented May 28 run-off was welcomed by officials in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as it would bring a sense of continuity and strengthen relations between Ankara and the bloc, as well as its six members.
Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani of Qatar was the first foreign head of state to congratulate Erdogan, who took office for his third presidential term, and other Gulf leaders quickly followed suit, expressing their desire to strengthen ties with Turkey.
The 69-year-old Erdogan, whose two-decade rule will be extended for another five years, is expected to visit the Gulf soon to demonstrate how important GCC members have been to Turkey’s foreign policy agenda.
Between now and 2028, the GCC states can expect business as usual in their relations with Ankara.
Turkey’s strong alliance with Qatar is likely to continue to deepen, while Erdogan also seeks to expand relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as Ankara’s rapprochement with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi accelerates.
“It is likely that relations between Turkey and the Gulf will continue to have a personalized character, as it has been for the past two decades,” Sinem Cengiz, a researcher at the University of Qatar and an Arab News columnist, told Al Jazeera.
“Therefore, the next five years of Erdogan’s tenure are likely to see continued collaboration of the personalities in a number of areas.”
Erdogan’s re-election came as a relief to many Gulf officials, as his challenger Kemal Kilicdaroglu would likely have changed Turkey’s foreign policy towards the GCC in a way that could have undermined their interests. Qatar, in particular, had reason to fear a deterioration in relations with Ankara if Kilicdaroglu had won.
“The opposition candidate was convinced that Erdogan had made certain off-the-record deals with the capitals of the Gulf — and thus regularly espoused highly skeptical views of the Gulf,” Batu Coskun of the Sadeq Institute told Al Jazeera.
Economic stability
Ankara will continue to value its economic, political and security ties with the wealthy GCC countries, which are important to Turkey’s trade and defense markets.
Closer Emirati-Turkish economic ties will also provide opportunities for the two countries, which have two of the largest economies in the Middle East, to unlock massive amounts of investment that can help both economies grow.
A few days after Erdogan secured another term, Turkey and the UAE ratified a cooperation agreement that aims to increase their bilateral trade to $40 billion over the next five years. Thani Ahmed al-Zeyoudi, the UAE’s foreign trade minister, tweeted: “This deal marks a new era of cooperation in our longstanding friendship.”
Negotiations on the deal had begun in 2021 when the UAE’s then-Crown Prince Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan visited Ankara, paving the way for a thaw in relations after years of tension.
“The prospect of hard cash from the Gulf will continue to be a major boost for Ankara, which faces an ongoing currency crisis,” said Coskun.
“Turkey presents itself as a financial and business center for investors in the Gulf to invest in various sectors,” explains Cengiz. “I assume that investment in Turkey is one of (the) areas (in which) we can see competition between the GCC states, namely Saudi Arabia and the UAE.”
For the Gulf Arab states, closer ties with Turkey are important to their economic diversification agendas. In a variety of industries, from entertainment to tourism and food production, Turkish companies can play an important role in helping GCC states reduce their dependence on hydrocarbons.
Turkish companies, especially in the construction sector, have long penetrated the Gulf markets, contributing to the growth of mega projects, from airports to highways and stadiums to high-rises. Recently, a group of executives representing about 80 Turkish construction companies met with Saudi Aramco in Ankara for talks on $50 billion worth of potential projects in Saudi Arabia.
Turkey has a fast-growing defense sector, with high demand for items such as the Bayraktar TB2 drone (Birol Bebek/AFP)
There is also the defense sector, with the development of its own defense industry being a key pillar of Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 strategy.
“Turkey’s fast-growing defense industry could be integrated into the Saudi Vision 2030,” said Coskun. “This could take the form of joint production, technology transfer and training programs. Large investments could give Turkish defense industry production a leg in Saudi Arabia.”
Turkey’s relations with Syria
An important point in the relations between Turkey and the GCC is Syria. With Damascus regaining full membership in the Arab League last month after more than 11 years in the diplomatic wilderness, Ankara is also trying to reconcile with President Bashar al-Assad’s government.
But one of the factors making a normalization deal between Ankara and Damascus tricky is the status of the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in northern Syria. Turkey will want some security guarantees regarding the YPG, which it considers to be the Syrian wing of the PKK. Turkey, the US and the EU recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization.
Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have encouraged al-Assad’s government to accept the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) under the sovereign control of Damascus as part of its force integration into the Syrian state. In this sense, the capitals of the Gulf, especially Abu Dhabi, could “add a track in the Gulf to the existing track in Moscow used to facilitate (Turkish-Syrian) talks,” Coskun said.
Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan, left, hugs Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, right, during a rally in Saudi Arabia’s Jeddah on April 28, 2022 (Handout/SPA/AFP)
There are important questions about how possible future ties between Ankara and Damascus could affect the alliance between Turkey and the United States. Given that Washington does not want its allies and partners in the Middle East and North Africa to recognize al-Assad as a legitimate Arab president, Washington is unlikely to welcome Ankara in reopening formal ties with the Syrian government.
In this context, Turkey could benefit from certain GCC states first restoring al-Assad’s image, making it less controversial from the West’s perspective for Ankara to reconcile with Syria.
Coskun told Al Jazeera that Ankara “will try to deflect US pressure to normalize with al-Assad by advocating for a regional consensus on Assad’s return to the world stage”.
Rapprochement and reconstruction
Relations between countries in the Middle East and North Africa have evolved significantly since 2020. Not so long ago, Saudi Arabia and especially the UAE had a negative relationship with Turkey. Conflicting interests related to a myriad of crises in the post-Arab Spring period, such as Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, as well as the 2017-2021 blockade of Qatar, caused friction between Ankara on one side and the Saudi-UAE axis on the other. the other side.
Still, Turkey’s relations with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have improved significantly since about 2020.
“Erdogan is now entering a new chapter, unlike how it was about 10 years ago when the Arab Spring began,” said Dania Tafer, executive director of the Gulf International Forum.
Turkish President Erdogan, right, meets with UAE National Security Adviser Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed Al Nahyan in Ankara, Turkey, on Aug. 18, 2021 (Presidential Press Office/Handout via Reuters)
“Now, similar to the GCC states, Ankara’s strategy is more pragmatic with economic development as the main requirement rather than politically guided by ideology.
“In his last term, he restored relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and he will continue on that path. Turkey is likely to sign several trade, defense and security agreements with both the UAE and Saudi Arabia, among other GCC states.
“From a political perspective, restoring relations with Turkey is an alternative approach to countering Iranian influence in the region.”
Experts argue that there is every reason to expect this rapprochement to gain even more momentum over the next five years from Erdogan. In particular, the sale of Turkish drones to these two GCC members will further strengthen relations that began to mend a few years ago.
“The ties between Ankara and Abu Dhabi appear to be on track to expand further,” said Coskun. “The recent mutual ratification of the Comprehensive Partnership Agreement between Turkey and the UAE is a clear indication of this. The UAE also made a significant purchase of Bayraktar TB-2 UAVs last year. Abu Dhabi is likely to become an important market for Turkish defense industry exports.”
Coskun added that “the same prospect holds for Saudi Arabia – but we have yet to see a sale of TB-2s to Riyadh. Given that Qatar, the UAE and most recently Kuwait have signed agreements to purchase the famed UAVs, Saudi Arabia seems a very likely candidate. This new period is likely to lead to stronger relations between Ankara and Riyadh, particularly based on the defense industry.”
